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 
Abstract—The distortion in steganography that usually comes 
from the modification or recoding on the cover image during the 
embedding process leaves the steganalyzer with possibility of 
discriminating. Faced with such a risk, we propose generative 
steganography with Kerckhoffs’ principle (GSK) in this letter. In 
GSK, the secret messages are generated by a cover image using a 
generator rather than embedded into the cover, thus resulting in 
no modifications in the cover. To ensure the security, the 
generators are trained to meet Kerckhoffs’ principle based on 
generative adversarial networks (GAN). Everything about the 
GSK system, except the extraction key, is public knowledge for 
the receivers. The secret messages can be outputted by the 
generator if and only if the extraction key and the cover image are 
both inputted. In the generator training procedures, there are two 
GANs, Message- GAN and Cover-GAN, designed to work jointly 
making the generated results under the control of the extraction 
key and the cover image. We provide experimental results on the 
training process and give an example of the working process by 
adopting a generator trained on MNIST, which demonstrate that 
GSK can use a cover image without any modification to generate 
messages, and without the extraction key or the cover image, only 
meaningless results would be obtained. 
Index Terms—Information security, generative steganography, 
generative adversarial networks (GAN), Kerckhoffs’ principle  
I. INTRODUCTION 
TEGANOGRAPHY aims at sending out secret messages by 
embedding them into an innocent cover. The goal of 
steganography is to conceal the hidden channel by the public 
channel. However, there appear to be two hidden drawbacks 
deserving further research that mainly lie in 1) the insufficient 
resistibility to steganalysis and 2) the system security that relies 
on the secrecy of the design or implementation of data hiding. 
The first drawback is derived from the modification or 
recoding on covers. There is always modification or recoding 
on the cover after embedding, which is designed to appear as 
innocent as possible to ensure the existence of the hidden 
channel undetected. Such changes in the covers leave the 
steganalyzer with possibility of discriminating, because it 
brings in distortion that might be measured by establishing a 
distortion function. Since Syndrome-Trellis Codes (STC) was 
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proposed [1], steganography minimizing a heuristically- 
defined embedding distortion has been widely used, making the 
design of distortion functions the only focus. With the 
evaluation dimensions growing higher, the construction getting 
more complex, and deep-learning algorithms introduced in 
steganalysis [2][3], it appears that any change of the cover 
might be a hidden risk to expose the presence of data hiding.  
The other drawback lies in the security of the steganography 
system. The security (undetectability of secret messages and 
the hidden channel, specifically) always relies on the secrecy of 
the design or implementation, i.e., “security through obscurity”. 
However, “security through obscurity” may have theoretical or 
actual security vulnerabilities [4]. In general, specific methods 
of steganalysis often show more advantages in feasibility than 
universal methods by taking advantage of the insecure aspects 
of a steganography algorithm [5]. In contrast to “security 
through obscurity”, Kerckhoffs' principle [6], a fundamental 
principle of cryptosystem, is more appropriate for modern 
security systems. Because the fewer and simpler the secrets that 
one must keep to ensure system security, the easier it is to 
ensure system security. 
In this letter, we attempt to treat the above drawbacks 
through a distinctive method. We propose Generative 
Steganography with Kerckhoffs’ principle (GSK) in this letter. 
In GSK, the secret messages are sent out by using the cover to 
generate them rather than recoding the cover to carry them. 
There is no modification on the cover resulting in no distortion 
for steganalysis. The generator can be trained based on an 
emerging technology, generative adversarial networks (GAN) 
[7]. To ensure the security, Kerckhoffs' principle is introduced 
in this letter. Furon et al., has translated Kerckhoffs’ principle 
from cryptography to data hiding and classified the setups of 
watermarking attacks into four categories in [8][9]. Levels of 
security have been defined in these setups. The highest level 
called stego-security is defined in Watermarked Only Attack 
setup based on Kerckhoffs’ principle [10]. Our scheme is also 
designed to meet Kerckhoffs’ principle, i.e., the secret 
messages should be secure even if everything about GSK 
(including the trained generators), except the extraction key, 
are public knowledge. Specifically, the generator is required to 
output the desired results if and only if the extraction key and 
the cover image are both inputted.  
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows: We 
detail the framework of GSK in the following section. Section 
III elaborates the training architecture of the generator. Section 
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IV describes the working processes of GSK. Experiment results 
are demonstrated in Section V. Section VI concludes this 
research and details our future work. 
II. FRAMEWORK OF GSK 
The exchange of the secret messages in GSK is achieved by 
the cover images’ generating rather than their modification. To 
meet Kerckhoffs’ principle, the generator should be trained 
with following three objectives:  
1) Any image can be the cover, and the secret message can be 
generated with the cover image. 
2) The secret message can be obtained if and only if both the 
extraction key and the cover image are inputted. 
3) The extraction key itself or the cover image cannot reveal 
any knowledge of the secret message.  
The framework of GSK is shown in Fig. 1: The trained 
generators would be public knowledge. The sender first 
chooses an innocent image I as the cover. Then he obtains the 
extraction key k using the secret message s and the cover image 
I (Fig.1a). Second, I is sent out through the public channel and 
k through the key channel. We consider there is a channel to 
share the extraction key, and we pay no attention to the key 
channel anymore [8][9] (Fig.1b). 
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Fig. 1.  Framework of GSK: (a) Extraction key generation; (b) Data delivery; (c) 
The three cases of the receivers. 
As for the receivers (Fig.1c): Case 1, only k is received 
corresponding to a failed message delivery, there is only noise 
output. Case 2, only I is received corresponding to an intercept 
from attackers (we assume a worst case here that attackers 
would intercept the key channel due to its random-like form 
and I should be undetectable during its lossless delivery), there 
is only noise output. Case 3, I and k are both received, the 
message s could be obtained. 
III. TRAINING ARCHITECTURE OF THE GENERATOR  
The generator is the crucial piece of GSK. In this letter, we 
design to obtain such generators based on GAN. GAN aims to 
generate artificial samples indiscernible from the real 
counterparts via competition between a generator (G) and a 
discriminator (D), i.e., alternating the maximization and 
minimization steps in (1). 
       
noise
min max , log log 1
ss P x PG D
V D G D D G         
s x
  
(1) 
where D(s) is the probability that s is a real image rather than 
synthetic, and G(x) is a synthetic image for input x. In fact, it is 
easy to obtain a generator outputting desired results using GAN. 
However, GAN usually works under the unsupervised learning. 
All it needs to input is only noise to output a desired result. If so, 
we cannot control the output with a key. Our training goal is 
more complex than a general GAN. We attempt to establish two 
associations between the message s and the key k, and between 
the message s and the cover I. Therefore, training of the 
generator includes two stages: Message-GAN and Cover-GAN. 
A. Message-GAN 
The objective of Message-GAN is to use feature codes to 
control the output. Feature codes are a set of discrete random 
variables to represent the attributes of the samples from some 
dataset, which are independent and salient in generating 
meaningful samples (e.g., “face contours”, “colors of skin”, or 
“fat or thin”, etc., are features of the faces from CelebA. 
“number values”, “font weight”, etc., are features of the digits 
from MNIST). As shown in Fig.2, we use noise x together with 
feature codes f as input. GM aims not only to generate artificial 
samples indiscernible from the real samples, but to ensure the 
features of artificial samples conform with f. Feature codes 
equal to predefined constraint conditions on the output of GM. 
Ideally, there should be only meaningless outputs without f.  
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Fig. 2.  Structure of Message-GAN 
We use an existing technique, InfoGAN [11], as Message- 
GAN. There is high mutual information between f and GM(x, f) 
in InfoGAN. Mutual information I(X; Y) between X and Y is the 
reduction of uncertainty in X when Y is observed: 
         ;I X Y H X H X Y H Y H Y X           (3) 
If X and Y are determinately related, their mutual information 
gets a maximum. Then, we have the following minimax game: 
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where α is an extra hyperparameter [11]. There are other types 
of GANs that could act as Message-GAN, such as Auxiliary 
Classifier GAN [12], Conditional GAN [13]. The performances 
of the GANs might vary with different training datasets, which 
deserves our further research. 
B. Cover-GAN 
The objective of Cover-GAN is to make the cover image I be 
a necessary conditional input that can determine the generation 
of the message s. The function of Cover-GAN can be abstracted 
as a model shown in Fig. 3: GC, RC, and AC are all neural 
networks. The parameter-settings are denoted as θG, θR, and θA, 
respectively. The output of GC (θG, P, z) is c. The output of RC 
(θR, c, z) is P' . The output of AC (θA, c) is "P . GC and RC are 
the legal message exchangers sharing the input z. AC acts as the 
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attackers. GC generates a random-like output c to protect the 
communication with RC. RC and AC can both receive c. RC can 
recover P while AC attempts to recover P from c without z. 
GC RC 
AC
c
z
P P'
P''
θG θR 
θA 
 
Fig. 3.  Structure of Cover-GAN. 
The two adversarial sides are (GC, RC) and AC [14]: AC aims 
at recovering P; GC and RC are trained jointly to ensure that RC 
could recover P accurately and AC would obtain nothing useful 
about P. According to the different goals of (GC, RC) and AC, we 
give the distortion functions of the two adversarial sides. 
L1 distance d on the input (X, 'X ) is introduced to show the 
distortion between X and 'X : 
  
1
, ' '
N
i i
i
d x x

 X X                                (5) 
where N is the length of X and 'X . The loss functions of RC and 
AC are: 
      , , , , 'R R R RL L R E d     P z c P P            (6) 
      , , , "A A A AL L A E d     P c P P            
 (7) 
The goal of AC is to reconstruct P accurately, so the optimal 
AC (OA) is obtained: 
    , arg min
AA A A A A
O O L  c                (8) 
As the adversarial side against AC, networks GC, RC aim to 
communicate successfully and defeat the best possible version 
of AC. The loss function of (GC, RC) is obtained: 
          , , , ,GR G R GR R R A A R R A AL L L O E L O         c c
   
(9) 
where OA is updated after each training of AC. The optimal GC 
and RC (OG, OR) are obtain by minimizing LGR(θG, θR).  
      ,, arg min ,G RG R GR R GO O L                 (10) 
During the training of Cover-GAN, we start with (GC, RC). 
GC may initially produce c that neither RC nor AC could 
understand. After a few steps, RC could understand c better and 
better with (θG, θR) while c is not understood by the present AC. 
Then we keep the GC, RC fixed and train AC given the obtained 
value of (θG, θR) to obtain another OA. Next, we update OA and 
continue with (GC, RC) to obtain (OG, OR).  
We alternate the training on (GC, RC) and AC to reach the 
equilibrium state of them. It is typical of the continuous game 
and their outputs converge to equilibrium in which RC can 
accurately recover P while AC has a 50% chance to output the 
correct bits of P. It is noted that the reconstruction error of AC is 
not maximized [14]. If it were, all the outputs of A were 
completely wrong, and A could output P accurately in the next 
step by flipping all the present bits. Therefore, it is the mutual 
information between "P  and P that gets minimized and AC 
produces answers indistinguishable from random guesses. 
IV. GENERATIVE STEGANOGRAPHY WITH KERCKHOFFS’ 
PRINCIPLE 
All the generators trained on different datasets are public in 
GSK. The scenario of GSK is that a sender intends to send out 
the secret message s to a receiver by using a cover image I and 
appropriate generators chosen according to the content type of s. 
The workflow is shown in Fig. 4. The sender’s manipulation 
(Fig. 4a) is to obtain the extraction key k: First, the sender 
chooses feature codes to predefine s and ensure that GM could 
output s with the feature codes f. Then he chooses random 
codes f'  of the same length as f and calculates f'' :  
 f'' f f'                                       (11) 
The input of GC in Fig. 3 is (P, z), in which P= f'' and z is the 
identification code filtered from the cover image I through an 
advance appointed method.  For simplicity, z is the LSB of I in 
this letter. The output of GC is c. The extraction key k is given 
by (c, f' ). For security reasons, random codes f’ instead of 
feature codes f is used to make up the extraction key k in case 
that k is intercepted and k itself should not divulge any useful 
information about f. 
The receiver’s manipulation (Fig. 4b) is to obtain the secret 
message s with k(c, f' ) and z of I: First, z and c are inputted 
into RC to obtain f'' . Then f is calculated: 
 f f'' f'                                       (12) 
The secret message s can be outputted by GM with input f. 
Above knowable, k and z are both necessary for the generation 
of s. The security of GSK depends solely on the secrecy of k 
and the randomizer of f' . 
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Fig. 4.  Workflow: (a) sender’s manipulation; (b) receiver’s manipulation. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Experimental results on the training processes including 
Message-GAN and Cover-GAN are demonstrated first. Then 
an example is provided to show the working processes of GSK.  
A. Training processes of GSK 
  The training of Message-GAN is to obtain the feature codes 
f of a target message. The experiments are based on two 
datasets, MNIST and CelebA. Secret messages are contained in 
the output images of generators. The content types of the 
messages include decimal handwritten digits on MNIST or 
faces on CelebA. The training of Cover-GAN is to ensure RC 
could recover f''  losslessly while AC only outputs random bits. 
Message-GAN: We first test on MNIST by applying the 
setup in [11] mechanically. We use 1 ten-dimensional feature 
code, 2 latent codes and 62 noise variables as the input with a 
dimension of 74. Feature codes f of 4-bit indicates the number 
of one decimal digit. The outputs are a 28×28 8-bit gray image. 
The generated digit is recognizable from the output image, e.g., 
digit “5” in Fig. 5a. The results in Fig.5b-5e demonstrate that 
we can control the number of the generate digit using f and 
digits are randomly generated without f (Fig.5e). According to 
[11], more characteristics of the written digits, such as the 
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rotate direction or font weight of the digit, can already be 
controlled by feature codes. That could enhance the amount of 
the meaningful information contained in an output image. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
  
(c) 
 
(d) 
  
(e) 
Fig. 5.  Sample results on MNIST: (a) digit “5” in the output image; (b) f: digits 
0,1,2,3; (c) f: digits 4,5,6,7; (d) f: digits 6,7,8,9; (e) Outputs without f. 
We continue our test on CelebA to output faces using 10 
ten-dimensional feature codes and 128 noise variables as the 
input with a dimension of 228. f here is used to control some 
highly semantic variations that a generated face carries (e.g., 
with glasses or not in Fig. 6a, with smile or not in Fig. 6b). The 
specific semantic information in the faces is the message we 
can generate. Without f, we use deep convolutional-GAN 
(DC-GAN) [15] to act as the attacker who could have access to 
our training dataset but know nothing about f.  The outputs of 
DC-GAN with 3×10
4
 training steps on CelebA are randomly- 
generated faces that cannot carry any artificially added 
semantic information as shown in Fig.6c.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 6. Sample results on CelebA: (a) f: with glasses or without glasses; (b) f: 
with smile or without smile; (c) Outputs of DC-GAN without f. 
Experimental results on MNIST or CelebA demonstrate that 
f can act as the preconditions for generating the desired 
messages. However, f on CelebA cannot be set long yet, and 
depicting on human faces is not rich or precise enough. 
Therefore, we use GM on MNIST in the following sections. 
Cover-GAN: The architectures of GC, RC, and AC are based 
on adversarial neural symmetric cryptography in [14]. We 
choose an image randomly as the cover image I. The 
identification code z is obtained from the LSB of I. During 
training, error rates of RC and AC for recovering f'' are recoded 
once per 1000 steps in Fig. 7. After about 1.6×10
4
 steps, RC is 
able to recovery each bit of f'' accurately with z while error 
rates of AC approach 50% and then remain stabilized without z. 
It demonstrates that f'' cannot be obtained without I, thus 
ensuring the secrecy of feature codes f and the message s.  
 
Fig. 7.  Error rates of R and A. 
B. Working processes of GSK 
We intend to send decimal digits as an example of GSK in 
this section. To send one decimal digit of 4 bits, we need the 
trained generators on MNIST and a 4-bit identification code z 
from the cover image I. Then we obtain the extraction key k of 
8 bits ( f'' , z and c all have the same length as f). We test the 
performances of GSK in the 3 cases described in GSK 
framework (Fig.1c) on 10 sample data. Each sample has 300 
decimal digits as secret messages. In case1 or case2, only 
random digits are generated due to the absence of k or I. In 
case3, the message s can be obtained accurately. Bit-error rates 
between s and the output bits in the 3 cases are calculated. The 
five best-performance samples are shown in Table. I. 
TABLE. I 
ERROR RATES BETWEEN THE MESSAGE BITS AND THE OUTPUT BITS 
 Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Sample4 Sample5 
Case 1 0.5058 0.4833 0.4908 0.4917 0.4933 
Case 2 0.4817 0.5125 0.4842 0.4775 0.5050 
Case 3 0.0042 0.0067 0.0008 0.0017 0.0025 
 
Capacity of GSK is determined by the complexity of the 
training datasets and the control effect of feature codes. In this 
letter, one output of the generator on MNIST is a 28×28 8-bit 
gray image. The theoretical maximum of the capacity is 6272 
bit when the output image is fully utilized. In our example, only 
one digit is carried by an output image. The available 
information has only 4 bits. The availability factor (AF) of the 
output image is 0.0638%. 
Key size factor (KSF) is the length ratio of k and s, which 
indicates the cost of the key k for generating the message s:  
KSF = length (k) / length(s)                           (11) 
The KSF of GSK on MNIST is 2 in our example. In this letter, 
the extraction key consists of f' and c. Different from the key 
in cryptography, c must be transmitted through key channel, 
which might limit the applications of GSK. But the amount of c 
is small compared with the total amount of the output image. 
Therefore, further researches should focus on increasing AF 
and reducing KSF to improve the practicality.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The main contribution of this letter is that we first propose a 
framework of generative steganography with Kerckhoffs’ 
principle. To ensuring the security, the generator is required to 
output the secret message if and only if the cover image and the 
extraction key are both inputted. We give the experimental 
results to demonstrate the feasibility of GSK and discuss some 
evaluation criteria of GSK. Future work would mainly focus on 
1) enhancing the capacity by applying GSK to the complicated 
datasets and intensifying the control effect of the feature codes, 
2) optimizing the architecture of Cover-GAN to reduce the KSF 
of GSK, and 3) integrating Message-GAN and Cover-GAN 
into one to simplify the training processes. 
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